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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I. Generally
A copyright automatically comes into existence as soon as an original work of
authorship is written down or otherwise fixed in a tangible form. No further action needs
to be taken. Nevertheless, it is better to place a valid copyright notice on all published
works and to register these works in the U.S. Copyright Office after publication. In the
past, all published works had to contain a copyright notice ("©" followed by the
publication date and copyright owner's name) to be protected by copyright. However the
use of copyright notice is now optional. The registration in the U.S. Copyright Office
makes the copyright a matter of public record and provides a number of important
advantages if it is necessary to go to Court to enforce it.
The copyright registration is a legal formality by which a copyright owner makes a
public record in the U.S Copyright Office in Washington D.C of some basic information
about the copyrighted work, such as the title of the work, who did the work and who
owns the copyright. To register, one must fill out the appropriate forms, pay an
application fee, and mail the application and the fees to the Copyright Office along with
one or two copies of the copyrighted work. 1
1
See <http:www.copyrightoffice.com >.
2State and federal trademark laws protect distinctive words, phrase, logos and other
symbol that are used to identify products and services in the marketplace. The Federal
Patent laws3 protect new invention.
4
Trade secrets 5are only protected by state laws.
The term intellectual property in my thesis refers to patents, trademarks and
copyrights. There are all subjected to federal statutes. Other types of intellectual property
such as trade secret may also be used as collateral in secured financing, but will not be
addressed in this thesis because such transactions are regulated exclusively by state law.
2 They protect names, titles, or short phrases. A manufacturer, merchant or group associated with a product
or service can obtain protection for words, phrases, logos or other symbols used to distinguish their product
or service from others.
3 A patent may protect the functional features of a machine, process, manufactured item, composition of
matter, ornamental design or asexually reproduced plants. A patent also protects new users for any such
items. However, to obtain a patent, the invention must be novel and non-obvious.
One has to notice, that the basic difference between a patent and a copyright is that a patent protects ideas
as expressed in an invention, whether a machine or process of some type. Copyright protects only the
words an author uses to express an idea, not the idea itself.
An invention is any art, machine, manufacture, design, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, or any variety of plant, which is or may be patentable under the patent laws. See 37
C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
A trade secret is information or know-how that is not generally known in the community and that
provides its owner with a competitive advantage in the marketplace. The information can be an idea,
written words, formula, process or procedure, technical design, list, marketing plan, or any other secret that
provides to the owner an economic advantage. The Court of most of the states will protect the owner from
disclosure of the secret by:
- The owner employees
- Other persons with a duty not to make such disclosure
- Industrial spies
- Competitors who wrongfully acquire the information.
Trade secret is only protected by state law and varies from state to state.
3II. Development in the use of intellectual property as collateral to secure credit.
A. Recognition of intellectual property as a valuable asset
1. The economic significance of intellectual property
The practice of using intellectual property as collateral to secure financing is over a
century old. In the late 1880's, Thomas Edison used his patent for the incandescent
electric light as collateral to borrow money in order to start his own company.
The real value of intellectual property is that the owner has a protected interest in
such property
7
and that intellectual property usually involves high economic stakes.
A Company's intellectual property is often more valuable than its real property.
o
According to Melvin Simensky
,
trademarks may represent as much as eighty percent of
a company's value. As an illustration, one can consider Marlboro cigarettes. One in four
cigarettes sold in the United States is a Marlboro cigarette, and the estimate worth of the
Marlboro trademark is $ 40 billion worldwide.
Another reason for the recognition of intellectual property as a valuable asset is the
merger and acquisition activity of the 1980's. "Various forms of intellectual property are
the foundation for market dominance and continuing profitability for many companies.
6
See ANDRE MILLARD, EDISON AND THE BUSINESS OF INNOVATION 43-46 (1990).
RICHARD RAYSMAN, Carrying out effective intellectual property due diligence, Corporate counselor 1997,
at 1.
8 MELVIN SIMENSKY, The New Role of Intellectual Property in Commercial Transactions, 10 ENT.
SPORTS L.J.5, 5 (1992).
9
See id. at 5.
Very often they are prized target in merger and acquisition."
10
Intellectual property is
such an important asset for the corporation because of the emergence and development of
the new technology company, that bases its assets and value on new creations involving
intellectual property rights, such as software.
2. Distinction between technology and traditional company.
The distinction between technology companies and other types of companies is partly due
to the fact that, while for traditional industry intellectual property is mostly a small part of
the collateral in financing, for a technology company such as Software Company,
intellectual property represents the companies main assets. 1 'Furthermore, while in a
traditional company intellectual property may be static, the value is always changing in
companies dealing with technology.
B. The use of intellectual property as collateral
1. The efficiency of secured credit
The distinction between a transaction in which the lender has a security interest in
collateral and those in which he has nothing is crucial. The law classifies creditors into
two groups, secured creditors and unsecured creditors, and provides special benefits to
those creditors that fall under the "secured" classification.
10 GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSEL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS
atvii(1989).
" See PAUL J. N. ROY, JOHN P. BROCKLAND, JOHN F. LAWLOR, security interest in technology assets and
related intellectual property: Practical and Legal Considerations, 16 NO. 8 COMPUTER LAW/ L. J. 3, at 1
(1999).
5One must consider why people use secure transaction. Alan Schwartz's 1981 article
in the journal of legal studies suggests that a rational lender would secure his debts to the
greatest degree possible. He "predicts [ ] that, other things equal, firms will issue as
much secured debt as they can". However Barry Alder notes that "the puzzle of secured
credit appears valuable but is not ubiquitous".
According to Professor Mann, 14 none of the scholars has explained the pattern of secured
credit in economy. He argues that the existing theories focus just on the efficiency
question. Thus he does not share in the opinion of most scholars. He believes that the real
question should be "what motivates the parties to choose between secured and unsecured
credit."
15 He considers the answer to that question to be crucial because "until we can
explain those motivations, we cannot intelligently evaluate how the legal system should
respond to parties use of secured credit". 16
A lender secures its debts because of the direct and indirect advantages that secured
credit provides to the creditor who uses it.
On the one hand, there is a "direct advantage which is to enforce payment." 17 Lynn
I Q
Lopucki has explained that the law of secured credit enhances the lender's ability to
See ALAN SHWARTZ, Security Interest and bankruptcy priority; A review ofcurrent theories, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, at 24-25 (1981). One should note that the author interviewed more than twenty borrowers and
lenders in different sectors of the economy to learn about the market of secured credit.
13 BARRY E. ALDER, An equity agency solution to the bankruptcy priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 74
(1993).
14 RONALD J. MANN, Explaining the pattern ofsecured credit, 1 10 HARV. L. REV 625, 630-633 (1997).
15
Id. at 7.
16
Id. at 8.
17
See, LYNN LOPUCKJ, the unsecured creditor's bargain, 80 VA. L. REV.1887, 1921-23 ( 1994).
18
Id. at 1920
enforce payment in three separate ways: Lynn Lopucki notes that the doctrinal concept
of security consists of encumbering the collateral, granting priority and enhancing the
lender's remedy.
On the other hand, there are many indirect advantages attached to the secured
transaction. For example, the grant of collateral can enhance the borrower's will to repay
the loan voluntarily or restrain the borrower's incentive to engage in risky conduct.
Another indirect advantage is that the borrower will limit subsequent borrowing. In other
words, Ronald Mann believes that the borrower will pay more attention to the business if
the borrower has a more substantial stake in the business.
2. Principal consequences in securing a transaction
Intellectual property has recently become an important source of collateral in secured
transactions mostly because of the development of the industries in fields of new
technology. In addition, the full potential of intellectual property as collateral must be
taken into consideration in order to help the creditors to go beyond difficulties in
identifying, valuing, and collateralizing intellectual property. Access to capital through
the use of intellectual property as collateral is especially crucial for start-up and high
technology companies that usually have few assets other than patent or copyrights.
According to Thomas L.Bahrick23
,
there are several consequences when a party secures a
19
Id. at 1920
The lender has a permanent interest in an identifiable asset or group of assets.
21 The lender will be paid before the other creditors.
22
23
The lender can receive payment more quickly than he could if the debts were not secured.
THOMAS L. BAHRICK, Security Interest in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. INTELL.PROP.ASS'N Q.J.30, 2
(1987).
7transaction. First, the category the collateral fall into will determine what category
should be included in the description of collateral in the securing agreement in order to
include the property as collateral.
24
Second, in a multiple state transaction, the category
the collateral falls into may determine which state's law will govern the transaction and
in where in the state the financing statement must be filed in order to perfect the security
interest.
25
In Re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc. , the Court explained that the
security interest has two purposes. Firstly, it will protect a creditor against competing
creditors claiming a security interest in the same collateral and secondly, it will assure to
the creditor that the debtor cannot transfer title to the collateral free of the creditor
interest.
III. Problematic
The government structure was established by the Constitution of 1789. The two
characteristics of that structure that most directly affect the legal system are "separation
of powers" and "federalism". This paper will focus on the latter concept. Federalism
means that there are two levels of government in the United States, federal and state. The
different states have a great deal of independence and powers. One of the basic problems
that characterize the United States legal system is the allocation of authority between
federal and state government. As a consequence, the existence of two different levels of
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
In Re Transportation Design and Technology, 48 B.R.635 (1985)
8government in the United States explains the complexity of some of the issues that this
paper will address.
Imagine a software start-up company called company that is looking for
financing. This company has main assets consisting of game software, and a trademark
that is rapidly gaining value. It receives financing from two banks and a French investor.
These lenders provide cash to help the company to grow. Later the business fails, the
debtor files for bankruptcy and a trustee is appointed.
The software company could collateralize its debts by granting its creditors a
security interest in the copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Lenders will take a security
interest in that property that will permit them to foreclose on the borrower's assets if the
borrower defaults on the loan. If many creditors hold a security interest in the same
collateral, they will probably not all be fully protected in the event of a default because
the collateral may be insufficient to satisfy all of the debts.
A lender should make sure in any transaction that intellectual property can be
used as collateral in a commercial environment free from superior claims by third parties.
First, it is important to identify and categorize the intellectual property asset involved and
explicitly identify it through formal registrations.
Once the intellectual property asset has been identified, the lender must ensure him
that the assets are properly protected and perfected. Perfection is the process by which a
secured party's interest in a debtor's collateral is protected against competing claims to
the collateral by third parties. The perfection of a security interest is fundamental because
if it is not perfected, the secured party may lose its claim to the secured property as
against judgment lien creditors such as the trustee in bankruptcy proceedings. The
perfection of a security interest in intellectual property is an area of the law which is
notable for its uncertainty and inconsistency with regard to the different requirements
depending upon the type of intellectual property at issue. The law governing secured
credit in U.S. are in many respects not well defined or adapted to intellectual property as
collateral. The problems associated with secured credit in intellectual property are
various.
First, security interests in intellectual property involve two bodies of law, federal
intellectual property law (Copyright Act, Patent Act and Trademark Act) and state
commercial law (Uniform Commercial Code). Lenders that make loans are confronted
with two sets of filing systems (federal and state) and ownership rules that are
contradictory. Furthermore, and as a direct consequence of the first issue, the priority
rules will depend on whether or not a party has properly perfected its security interest?
Lenders to a company who wish to use intellectual property as collateral are faced
with several questions to which the answers are unclear. To perfect a security interest,
must a lender record according to state law, federal law or both? How is priority among
competing creditors determined. Can a lender take and perfect a security interest in the
debtor's after-acquired property? Another serious problem is whether federal or state law
governs the parties 'rights. Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the federal statutes
control the creation of security interest in copyrights, patents and trademark. It is unclear,
however, to what extent federal regulations preempt the U.C.C. in a particular secured
transaction.
The purpose of the present paper is to let French lawyers know which step they
need to take in order to best assist their client in securing a more solid investment.
Lenders want to be protected. Lenders want to be sure that they can use the intellectual
property rights in a commercial environment free from superior claims by third parties. In
other words, a lender who provides a large loan to a borrower want to know how and
where its security interest will be perfected and what is the best way for him to have
priority over other claims.
Just as intellectual property law requires one to take active steps to protect one's
rights by obtaining a patent, trademark, or copyright registration, certain steps must be
taken to maintain creditor's rights. In addition, there is a great need for clarity in the
laws dealing with the use of intellectual property as collateral. Several solutions and
proposals have been submitted to reform the actual system. It has been advocated that
federal law should govern security interests in intellectual property because a single law
could resolve the uncertainty. In addition, it has also been argued that federal laws
should be improved in other ways. Others defend the thesis that a "mixed perfection"
approach is the best method to resolve the issues. This thesis has little to add to the
proposed reforms. Instead the purpose is to urge transactional lawyers to resolve these
issues through private commercial arbitration. Indeed, arbitration of commercial
disputes arising in interstate and international commerce is commonplace. Such a
solution would make it easier for attorney to advice their clients and would offer them
more certainty. Arbitration could resolve who has what rights to many forms of
intellectual property. Issues can be overcome through drafting and negotiation of
particular contracts. One should note that the legal sitting in U.S. is favorable to
commercial arbitration, including the use of intellectual property to resolve intellectual
II
property disputes. I believe that this is the most practical solution, which most easily
lends itself to immediate results.
Security interests in intellectual property are not governed by comprehensive
statutory guidelines. The paucity of case law offers little guidance as to where other
courts might come out on these issues. This paper will focus on the main issues relating
to the use of intellectual property as collateral concerning the method for perfecting a
security interest in such property. Indeed, it will be very helpful to resolve the
uncertainty existing around the method of perfecting a security interest to enhance the
use of intellectual property as collateral in financing transaction.
This paper will first examine the classification of collateral and represents an effort
to summarize whether a state or a federal filing is required to perfect a security interest.
Second, the paper will examine the main issues arising out from the priority rules in the
area of bankruptcy. Finally, this paper will address the different proposals suggested in
order to have a clarification of the actual system.
CHAPTER 2
USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL IN FINANCING
TRANSACTIONS: METHOD FOR PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST.
Both the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C)27 and the relevant federal statutes28 control
the creation of a security interest in patent,29 copyright
30
and trademark. 31
27
Article 9 of the U.C.C governs the creation of a security interest. See U.C.C § 9-101 to 9-507
28 The applicable federal statutes for patent, trademark and copyright are the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C §§ 1- 376
( 1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C §1051-1127 ( 1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C § 101-810 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) respectively.
29 A patent may be obtained to protect the inventor or discoverer of "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof 35 U.S.C §§ 101 (
1988). Patent protection is only possible through federal registration and provide the patent holder with
exclusive right to make, use and sell the invention throughout the United States for a period of 17 years
30 Copyright protection is available for "original works of authorship fixed in any intangible medium of
expression." 17 U.S.C § 102 (1988). This includes (unlimited list) (1) literary works;(2) musical work;(3)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and scriptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works( 7) sound recording; and (8) architectural works. See § 102 (aX 1988 & Supp. V
1993). Copyright protection does not extend to any ideas, procedure, process system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery" See § 102 (b). It is clear that the federal registration is not mandatory.
However in doing so, the copyright holder will benefit of three advantages. First an early registration is
prima facie a proof of the validity of the copyright, see § 410(c). Second, for works of United States origin,
registration is a perquisite to an infringement action, see § 411(a). Third, statutory damages and attorney
fees may be awarded only if registration is made prior infringement, see § 412. Because of these
advantages, lenders usually require copyright registration before taking a security interest in such ^.operty.
31
Trademark include any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof (1) used by a person,
or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce... to identify and distinguish his or her
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by other and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown. See, 15 U.S.C §1127 (1988). A trademark is protectable whether
or not it is federally registered under the Lanham Act. Federal registration however gives to the patent
holder significant procedural and substantive advantages. See §§ 1 1 1 1-1 126 ( 1988 & Supp. V. 1993)
12
13
I. The actual system
A. The Uniform Commercial Code32 (U.C.C)
1. General scope of article 9 of the U.C.C
Article 9 of the U.C.C governs secured transactions. It applies to "any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property
including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or
accounts."
33
Thus, article 9 applies to security interest in "general intangibles".
34The 1972
official text defines security interest as "an interest in personal property which secures
payment or performance of an obligation." A security interest does not transfer title to
the creditor, nor does it give to the creditor a present right of possession. Whatever rights
it gives the creditor vest only upon default by the debtor of the underlying obligation.
2. General intangible: copyrights, trademarks and patents
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) breaks collateral into categories. General
intangibles are defined as "any property... other than goods..."
36
and the official
commentary to section §9-106, specifies that copyrights, trademarks and patents are
32
See, BLACK LAW DICTIONARY, 6th edition, 1990 "One of the Uniform Commercial Code was
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform state Laws and the American Law
Institute governing commercial transactions (including sales and leasing of good, transfer of funds,
commercial paper, bank deposit and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfer, warehouse receipts, bills of
lading, investment securities, and secured transaction). The U.C.C has been adopted in whole or
substantially by all states."
33 U.C.C § 9-102 (l)(a)
34
Id.
35 U.C.C § 1-201(37)
U.C.C. §9- 106 defines general property as "any personal property other than goods, accounts, chattel
paper, documents, instrument, and money."
14
included within that definition of general intangible. Goods are defined as "all things
which are movable at the time the security interest attaches. . .but does not include general
intangible." Therefore, as there is a distinction between general intangibles and goods,
we can suppose that general intangibles and goods are mutually exclusive categories. A
general principle can be derived from United States v. Antenna Inc. If the dominant
attribute of a piece of property is that it embodies knowledge, ideas, concepts and
principles, then the property will likely be classified as a general intangible under the
U.C.C. However, if physical utility is the chief attribute of a piece of property, then it will
likely be classified as a good.
3. Method of perfection of a security interest.
a. Legal requirements
There are basic prerequisites to the existence of a security interest.
1) Security agreement
40
For a security interest to exist, the debtor must have signed41 a "security agreement"
that contains a description of the collateral.42 It is considered to be sufficient if it
Section 9-106 of the U.C.C. provides that the term "general intangibles" brings under this Article
miscellaneous types of contractual rights and other personal property which are used and may become
customarily used as commercial security ... examples are copyrights, trademarks and patents, except to the
extent that they may be excluded by Section 9-104 (a)." See also, United States v. Anderson, 895 F.2d 641,
647.
38
§9-105(l)(h)
39
See, United States v. Antenna Inc, 251 F. Supp 1013
The definition of security agreement is "an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest" §
9-105(1)
41 U.C.C § 9-203(1 )(a)
42
See id.
15
"reasonably identifies what is described." This description must provide that the debtor
has received value or has the right in the collateral.
44
However, this is not necessary if the
"collateral is in possession of the other secured party pursuant to the agreement". 45 The
official commentary of § 9-203(1) provides that:
The requirement of written record minimizes the possibility
of future dispute as to the terms of a security agreement and as to
what property stands as collateral for the obligation secured.
Where the collateral is in the possession of the secured party, the
evidentiary need for a written record is much less than where the
collateral is the debtor's possession.
2) Financing statement
Many times, the perfection of a security interest in a "general intangible" requires
the filing of a U.C.C-1 financing statement47 with a state office. 48 A financing statement
standing alone is not sufficient for the perfection of a security interest because language
"creating" or "providing for a security interest" is necessary.
49
The revised article 9 of
the U.C.C makes it clear that the security agreement need only describe the collateral by
type. A financing statement is "sufficient if it... contains a statement indicating the types,
or describing the items of the collateral." If a financing statement contains a small set of
items compared to those described in the security agreement, the perfection of the
security interest is limited to the description included in the financing statement.
43
Id.
44
U.C.C § 9-203(1 )(b) and (l)(c)
45 U.C.C § 9-203(1 )(a)
4
Jld.
A financing statement is a simple document meant to convey basic information for the benefit of
interested third party; See BAIRD & JACKSON, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
66-67 (2d ed 1987)
48
See U.C.C §§ 9-302(1), 9-304
16
b. Jurisprudence
In the past several courts have had to consider certain issues arising out of the
requirements above mentioned. An analysis of different cases in these matters shows that
when a lender takes a security interest in a borrower's property, the lender will logically
try to include as much as possible in the description of the collateral. However, a lender
can take a global security interest in the borrower's property as long as the collateral
"reasonably identifies what is described."50 Indeed, the lender can specify that he has a
security interest in "all the debtor's intellectual property rights, including but not limited
to copyrights, patents and trademarks." This practice is also called a "blanket lien"51
,
which gives the status of a secured creditor to the lender in all of the borrower's
copyrights, patents and trademarks, even if they have not been specifically identified. In
Beverly L.Fuqua v First National Bank ofHoward 52 , the Court of Appeals specifies that:
The description must be such as will enable third persons, aided by
reasonable inquiries which the instrument suggests, to identify the
property. Even though the instrument lacks details, if it gives clues
sufficient that third person by reasonable care and diligence may
ascertain the property covered, it is adequate... However, it is
sufficient if the description is simply of all "personal property" of
the debtor.
49
See, In Re Numeric, 485 F. 2d 1328 (1st Cir. 1973) and In Re Morey Mach. Co. Great W. Indus. Mach.,
507 F 2d. 987 ( 5 th Cir. 1975)
50
See, revised U.C.C § 96108 (c) (1999)
50
U.C.C §9-402(1)
50 U.C.C §9-1 10
ALICE HAEMMERLI, Insecurity Interest: where intellectual property and commercial law collide, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1645 (1996).
52
In Beverly L. Fuqua v First National Bank of Howard, 461 F.2d 1 186
17
In Lehigh Press, Inc. v. National Bank of Georgia, a lender obtained a security interest
in certain assets of one of its borrowers and filed a financing statement that described the
collateral as "all personal property, equipment and fixtures of whatever kind and
description". Additionally, a subsequent secured party also obtained a security interest in
all assets of the borrower and filed a financing statement referred generally to "all
account and contract rights". A dispute arose between the two secured parties. In
resolving it, the court held that the first lender had not perfected a security interest in the
account because the financing statement referred generally to "all personal property" and
specifically to "equipment" and "fixtures", but not specifically to "accounts". Moreover,
the court held that a reference to "all personal property" was not adequate under the
U.C.C. §9-402(l). 54
4. After-acquired collateral
The U.C.C. allows the creditor to obtain and to perfect a security interest in
properties that the debtor may acquire in the future, after the security interest has been
filed.
55 However, under the federal statutes, lenders face problems when they try to
perfect after-acquired property. As an illustration, according to the Copyright Act, the
only proper method of filing a security interest is to file a document that "specifically
identifies the work to which [such document] pertains."56 One can observe that this
provision speaks for itself concerning the impossibility of having a blanket lien allowing
53
Lehigh Press, Inc.v. National Bank of Georgia, 1 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 993 ( Ga. Ct. App.1990)
U.C.C 402(1) provides that "a financing statement is sufficient if it contains a statement indicating the
types, or describing the items of collateral", 1 1 U.C.C.
"U.C.C §9-204
18
for the automatic perfection of after-acquired collateral. Furthermore, neither the Patent
Act nor the Lanham Act contains a provision that would allow the lender to perfect a
security interest in the future.
5. Filing a financing statement: Manner and Location
a. Legal requirement
1) Old article 9
It is crucial that the secured party file its financing statement in the right place. The
creditor is required to file its financing statement in order to perfect its security interest in
accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods in the state in which the debtor is
located.
57
If a borrower changes his location from one state to another, a security interest
perfected by a filing in the prior state "is perfected until the expiration of four months
eg
after a change of the debtor's location." If the security interest is not perfected in the
second state within that period of time, "it becomes unperfected thereafter and is deemed
to have been unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser after the change.
The perfection in the second state does not need to have the debtor's signature. 59
56 17U.S.C. §205(C)(1)(1988)
"U.C.C §9-103(3)
58 U.C.C §9-103(3)(e)
59 U.C.C § 9-402 (2)(a)
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2) revised article 9
6
Revised article 9 makes the determination of the place where the creditor has to file
much easier. Now the correct place of filing is the state of organization for an entity
created by registration within the state61 (e.g., a corporation), or the state of the entity
chief executive office for entities not created by registration with the state (general
partnership), or the state of an individual principal residence.
B. Federal statutes
1. Copyright Act
a. Method of perfection: generally
The Copyright Act is quite clear, compared to the Patent Act, concerning the
method of perfecting a security interest. Any "assignment, mortgage, exclusive license
or... other governance" creating a present, future or potential relationship between the
parties is to be considered a transfer of copyright ownership."64
b. Method of perfection: what and where to file?
The Copyright Act provides that "any transfer of copyright ownership or other
document pertaining to a copyright" may be recorded to the US Copyright Office. 65 The
definition of "transfer" under the Act includes any "mortgage" or "hypothecation" of a
60
See, revised article 9 U.C.C § 307(b)
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
37 C.F.R § 201.4 (a)(2)(1993)
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copyright "in whole or in part" and "by any means of conveyance or by operation of
law."
66 The term "mortgage" or "hypothecation" includes a pledge of property as
security or collateral for a debt. The Copyright Office has defined a document
pertaining to a copyright "as one that has a direct or indirect relationship to the existence,
scope, duration, or identification of a copyright, or to the ownership, division, allocation,
licensing, transfer, or exercise of rights under a copyright. That relationship may be past,
present, future or potential." An agreement granting a security interest in a copyright
may be recorded in the Copyright office.
Similarly, because a copyright entitles the holder to receive all income derived from
the display of creative work,69 an agreement creating a creating a security interest may
also be recorded in the Copyright office. According to section 205(a), a written
instrument evidencing transfer must be recorded in the Copyright Office. Such
recordation serves as constructive notice of the facts stated in the document, provided that
the document is identified as a registered work. The filing of a security agreement with
the Copyright Office should be all that is necessary to perfect a security interest in
registered copyrights and therefore, state registration should be ineffective with respect to
65 17U.S.C.§205(a)
66 17U.S.C.§ 101, 201 (d)(1)
67
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 669 (5 th . Ed. 1979)
68 37C.F.R. §201.4 (a) (2)
69
See 17U.S.C.§ 106
Id at § 205 (a). According to Ronald J. Mann Secured "although section 205 (a) simply states that a
transfer "may be recorded in the Copyright Office" the statute effectively makes that filing mandatory
because section 205(a) grant priority to second-in-time recorded transfer over a prior but unrecorded
transfer if the-first- in-time transferee fails to record within one month after its execution in the U.S
21
7
1
79
perfection. Some authors subscribe to this approach. For example, Ronald J. Mann
thinks that a prudent creditor wishing to perfect a security interest "should file in the
federal copyright records and that a parallel state U.C.C. filing (is) not necessary or
71
effective to use the language of section 9-302(3) of the old Article 9." Nevertheless, he
adds that even though the Copyright Act and Peregrine decision state otherwise, many
lenders continue to file at a state level.
75 The reasons invoked by some lenders are that
their attorneys have advised them that other courts would be unlikely to follow
Peregrine™ On the other hand, others lenders give more practical explanation such as
the cost of filing in the federal system.
77
In addition, the former 1 909 copyright Act has sufficient provisions concerning the
filing of documents relating to copyright to supersede the filing provisions of the
U.C.C.
78
Professor Nimmer states "a persuasive argument . . . can be made . . . that by reason of
section 201, 204, 205 of the Copyright Act... Congress has preempted the field with
respect to the form and recordation requirement applicable to the Copyright mortgages."
71
See National Peregrine, Inc. 1 16 B.R, the court has to determine if a security interest is perfected by an
appropriate filing with the US copyright office or by U.C.C- 1 financing statement filed with the relevant
secretary.
72 RONALD J. MANN, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134
73
Id at 144
74
Supra, note 68
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See Telephone Interview with Dennis J. White, Sullivan & Worcester, LLP (Mar. 5, 1998). One should
note that the one qualify Peregrine's case as "just some wacko case out in California". In addition, in
discussing a large transaction in which a creditor ask for a filing only concerning the 25 most valuable
elements of the software out of a library of" hundreds if not thousands of titles". Another person suggests
that "most lenders" do not require a filing at a federal level in the Copyright Office on software loans below
$10.
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In other words, according to him, theses sections read together indicate a congressional
attempt to preempt Article 9 filing requirements. Even in the absence of express
language, federal regulation will preempt state law. Legislative history indicates that
"Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation or if the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject."79
The Copyright Act expressly preempts state law with respect to the exclusive rights
possessed by holder of copyright under federal law. 80 Section 106 of the Copyright Act81
states that the exclusive rights listed in section 106 include the right to reproduce the
copyright work, the right to distribute the work, the right to prepare derivative work, and
the right to display and perform the work. In Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and
Gardner, Inc., the ninth Circuit held that "in order to survive a federal preemption, a
state law must involve rights that are qualitatively different from the exclusive right
established by section 106 of the Copyright Act." A secured creditor needs only to file
in the Copyright office in order to give "all persons constructive notice of all the facts
stated in the recorded document." Thus, a third party who wants to know whether a
78
See U.C.C., § 9-104 cmt. 1
79
See Hillsborought County v. Automated Medical laboratories, Inc. 471 U.S. 707,713,
80
See U.S.C§ 301(a)
81 SeeU.S.C§ 106
82
Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc, 820 F.2d 973 (9 th Cir. 1987)
83
Id.
84
Id.
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particular copyright is encumbered, need only search information in front of the
Copyright Office. 85
c. Mechanics of recording
In order to record a security interest in the copyright office, a creditor may file
either the security agreement itself or a certified duplicate of the original, so long as
either is sufficient to place third parties on notice that the copyright is encumbered. The
Copyright Act requires that the filed document "specifically identify the work to which it
pertains so that, after the document is indexed by the register of copyrights, it would be
revealed by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work". It is
important to add that the filings with the copyright office can be less convenient than
oo
filing under the U.C.C. because the U.C.C filings are indexed by owner while
registration in the copyright office is by title or copyright registration number.
Since a federal statute provides for a national system of recordation or specifies a
place of filing different from that in Article 9, methods of perfection in Article 9 are
supplanted by that national system. When a federal statute provides a system of national
registration but fails to provide a priority scheme established by Article 9 (U.C.C. 9-301
and 9-312) will generally govern the conflicting rights of creditors. Whether a creditor's
interest is perfected, however, depends on whether the creditor recorded his interest in
85
See Northern Songs, Ltd. v. Distinguish Productions, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 638, 640-641
86
See 17 U.S.C § 205 (a)(c); 37 C.F.R § 201.4 (c)(1).
87
17 U.S.C § 205(c)
88
Id
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accordance with the federal statute. One has to note that if state methods were valid, a
third party who wanted to discover whether a particular interest had been transferred
would have to check not only the indices of any of the U.S Copyright Office, but also the
indices of the relevant secretaries of state. In addition, as a copyright is considered to be
an incorporeal right, the search is difficult because a number of authorities could be
relevant.
d. Software: requirements contain numerous practical obstacles
1) First obstacle: "Short life"
The Copyright Act provides that any document filed with the Copyright Office
must be done in a way that "specifically identifies the work to which [that document]
pertains."
90
In other words, the lender must file individually against each copyright. This
does not represent any particular problem if the lender is dealing with a work such as a
book or an architectural plan. However, this condition constitutes a real difficulty in the
area of the new technologies, such as the software development, because it is subjected to
rapid change and new development. Indeed, if a lender respects the rule above
mentioned, it implies that he must separately perfect his security interest in each
subsequent generation of the intellectual property that requires federal filing. As
William A. Dornbos91 affirms, "the copyright in the computer program would . . . have to
89
See U.C.C §9-302(4)
90 17U.S.C§ 101
91
WILLIAM A. DORNBOS, Structuring, Financing, and Preserving Security Interests in Intellectual Property,
113 BANKING L.J. 3.(1996)
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be registered on an ongoing basis as each segment is completed in order to minimize the
period during which the security interest is unperfected."
2) Second obstacle: deposit requirement
The Copyright Act requires the deposit to be in a form "usually perceptible without
the aid of a machine or device." Again, the requirement is pretty easy to respect
concerning the deposit of a traditional work such as a book. However it becomes a real
barrier concerning the deposit of a software. In other words,
what that requirement means is that it is not enough for the
copyright owner to give the Copyright Office a copy of the
software in the form that would be sold to a user. Instead, the
copyright owner must provide the Copyright Office with a printed
copy of the source code for the copyright software developers are
reluctant to release their source code because competitors easily
can "reverse engineer" from the code to develop competing
program that use the same concept, but do not infringe the
Copyright of the protected program.9
2. Patent
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) establishes procedures in order to obtain
patent protection.
94 The owner of a patent can assign its entire patent right (or any
interest on that right) to another party and may record the written assignment with the
PTO.
92 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (c) (vii) (A) (1998)
93 PAUL J. N.ROY, JOHN P.B. ROCKLAND, JOHN F. LAWLOR, Security Interest in Technology Asset and
Related Intellectual Property, Practical and Legal Considerations, 8 COMPUTER LAWYER , 1999, at 7.
94
See 35 U.S.C. § 153 (1994). (stating that "Patents shall be issued in the name of the United States of
America, under the seal of Patent and Trademark Office.")
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The Patent Act is not as clear as the Copyright Act concerning the perfection of a
security interest. Section 261 of the Patent Act states that
[a]n assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such
subsequent purchase or mortgage.
95
The Patent Act of 1952 does not contain an explicit provision concerning security
interests in patent. The Patent Act does not speak of security interests as such nor does it
provide for the filing of such interest.
As we can conclude from this provision, the Patent Act governs recordation of
assignments of patents, patent application, and legal interest in them, and does not
provide for recordation of non assignment interests such as liens. Unlike the Copyright
Act, the Patent Act does not specifically provide for the recordation of a "mortgage or. .
.
hypothecation". 96
3. Lanham Act
a. Section 10 of the Lanham Act
Trademark rights have a system of registration that is regulated both by state and
07
federal law. An owner can register a trademark with the United States Patent and
95
35 U.S.C.§ 261(1982)
96 17U.S.C§ 101(1988)
97
See La Terraza De Marti, Inc. v. Key West Flagrance & Cosmetic Factory, Inc., 617 F.Supp. 544, 547 (
S.D. Fla. 1985), Dave Grossman Designs, Inc. v. Bortin, 347 F Supp. 1 150 ( N.D. III. 1972)
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Trademark Office. An owner of a trademark can assign the mark by recording a written
assignment with the PTO. Furthermore, one should notice that the section 10
99
of the
Lanham Act requires the recordation of assignment, but does not mention security
interests.
Federal trademark law provides, for the filing of assignments in the Lanham Act, that "an
assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark office within three
months after the date thereof and prior to such subsequent purchase." 100
b. Does an assignment equal a security interest?
While the Lanham Act explains how to assign a mark, it does not address the
question of what a creditor has to do in order to perfect his security interest in a
trademark. There is a lack resulting from the Lanham Act on this issue.
Courts and commentators disagree over whether the assignment provision of the Lanham
Act creates a system for filing security interests in trademarks similar to the assignment
provision of the Patent Act. First, some commentators, such as Marci Levine Klumb,
note that the terms used are different from those used in the Patent Act. For example, the
federal recordation preserves the transferee's rights only against subsequent purchaser,
and not against a mortgagee like the Patent Act. The federal trademark regulations
provide that assignments will be recorded in the Patent and Trademark office. Other
The United States and Trademark Office has authority to establish the procedure in order to obtain
federal trademark legislation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994)
"&?<?15U.S.C. § 1060(1994)
100
Id.
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instruments, which may relate to such marks, may be recorded in the discretion of the
commissioner. Once again, the question is whether or not an assignment includes the
grant of a security interest.
In sum, the Federal Patent, Trademark and Copyright statutes each have provisions
for recording certain type of documents.
A serious problem arises as to whether these registration systems satisfy the
provisions of the U.C.C. which deal with filing requirements for security interests
governed by federal statutes, and therefore whether a security interest is perfected by
satisfying the requirement of the applicable federal statute or by complying with the state
filing requirement of Article 9 of the U.C.C. In other words, there are two ways of
perfecting a security interest in general intangibles. One way consists of filing a financing
statement in accordance with State law. The other consists in filing in accordance with
patent, trademark and copyright laws. 101 (Federal law)
101
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-307 (1982 Supp. IV. 1986)(Patent); 17 U.S.C.§§101-810 (Copyright); 15
U.S.C.§§ 1051-1 127 (Trademark).
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II. Perfection of a security interest: U.C.C. or federal filing?
It is unclear whether a security interest is governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C, by
Federal law, or by some combination thereof. Article 9 provides absolutely no clear
guidelines on this issue. Although security interest in copyright, trademark, and patent
are mentioned in the official comment, the drafters of Article 9 never resolved the extent
to which it governs security interest taken in form of intellectual property.
A. Interplay between state and federal filing
The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes federal preemption under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in two provisions.
1. Confused "stepback provisions" of the U.C.C: Section 9-104 and 9-302
a. Section 9-104
First, section 9-104 (a) states "that this Article does not apply ... to a security interest
subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the right
1 CV)
of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property."
Two ideas must been retained from that provision: the federal statute has to apply before
applying Article 9 because: a security interest is subjected to Federal statute and because
federal statutes govern the right of parties and third parties.
102
U.C.C. §9-104 (a)( 1987).
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b. Section 9-302
Section 9-302(3)(a) renders filing under state law ineffective to perfect a security
interest "in property subject to ... a statute or treaty of the United States which provides
for a national or international registration or a national or international certificate of title
or which specifies a place for filing of the security interest." In other words, where a
federal statute provides for filing a security interest, U.C.C. filing is not required.
According to section 9-302(4), which must be read with section 9-302(3), only a
federal statute can perfect a security interest. According to those statutes, it seems that
the U.C.C. filing system does not apply whenever a federal statute provides for a national
registration. However, the comments of these statutes cannot support such an
interpretation.
2. Comments to Sections 9-104 and 9-302
In addition to these statutes, it is essential to note the content of the comments 103 to
realize how unclear and confusing are the dispositions of these statutes. To begin with,
the comment to the section 9-104 states that:
Although the former Federal Copyright Act contains provisions
permitting the mortgage of a copyright for the recording of an
assignment of a copyright... such a statute would not seem to
contain sufficient provisions regulating the right of the parties and
third party to exclude securities interest in the copyright from the
provision of the Article.
In other words, the official commentary of the section 9-104 of the U.C.C. provides
that if a federal statute regulates the rights of the parties in a particular type of property
31
and a question comes up that is not explicitly addressed by that federal statute, the issue
may be resolved either with a federal or state law. Furthermore, section 9-302 goes on
and state that:
(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this
division is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest
in property subject to
(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which specifies... a
place different for filing a security interest.
(4) Compliance with a statute or treaty of the United States
described in subsection (3) is an equivalent to the filing of a
financing statement under this Article and a security interest in
property subject to a statute or treaty can be perfected only by
compliance therewith. .
.
Further, comment 8 to Section 9-302 states that:
Subsection (3) exempts from the filing provisions of this Article
transaction as to which an adequate system of filing, state and
federal, has been set up outside this Article and subsection (4)
makes clear that when such a system exists perfection of a relevant
security interest can be had only through compliance with that
system (i.e. filing under this Article is not a permissible
alternative).
104
The comments of the Section 9-104 (a) and 9-302 (3) are unclear and inconsistent.
They make it very difficult to know whether or not and to what extent the U.C.C. local
filing requirements apply to the perfection of security interest in patents, trademarks and
copyrights.
Even if we were to suppose that some provisions of the U.C.C. would seem to
answer to the question of whether federal or state law will govern the filing system, the
103
U.C.C. §§9-104 &9-302 Comment (1987)
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courts have adopted an another view. Indeed, in interpreting the law, the courts took an
unclear position because they generally consider that federal statutes will govern only if
the courts determine that federal statute was enacted with the intent of regulating secured
transactions involving the intellectual property at issue.
105 As a consequence and as a
precautionary measure, many commentators suggest that it is preferable not only to file
documents creating security interests in the proper federal offices, but also to prepare and
to file them in the proper state office. If a federal statute sufficiently "governs the rights
of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular type of property" 10
within the meaning of U.C.C. § 9-104, a security interest in that property is governed by
federal law and excluded from Article 9. The issue arising under, but not resolved by,
federal statute may be answered with reference to either federal or state law.
3. Copyright Issue.
To what extent does the federal statute apply to copyright registration?
In other words, what is the extent to which Copyright Act preempts state law? An
interpretation of Section 9-302 suggests that U.C.C. Filing does not apply to registered
copyrights. Indeed, Comment to U.C.C. § 9-104 states that, while permitting mortgages
of copyrights and providing for the recordation of assignments of copyrights, the federal
Copyright Act does not seem to contain sufficient provisions regulating the right of the
104 To illustrate the type of federal statute referred to in paragraph (3)(a), one has to look
the provisions of 17 U.S.C §§ 28,30 (Copyright); 49 U.S.C §1403(Aircraft); 49 U.S.C.
§20(c)(Railroad).
105 See TR-3 Industries, Inc .v. Capital Bank, 41 B.R, 128,1315 Bankr.C.D.Cal.1984) finding that state law
did not control because "it was not the purpose or intent of Congress in enacting the Lanham Act to provide
a method for the perfection of a security interest in trademarks.
33
parties and third parties to exclude security interests from this article. This comment
could suggest that the drafters conclude that the Copyright Act was not sufficient to
exclude all of Article 9. However, a major confusion comes from the comment to § 9-
302 (3) on exclusive federal filing. Some examples of a federal statute are stated in § 9-
302 (3) in which the provisions of 1909 Copyright statute are included.
Under Section 9- 1 04, if a federal statute governs the rights of the parties and third
parties, Article 9 is completely inapplicable (the federal statute replaces Article 9 only "to
the extent" that it governs, however, if an issue arises that is not addressed by the Federal
statute, therefore Article 9 will apply).
107
Concerning the applicability of Section 9-302, one has to consider whether the
federal statute provides for a national place of filing of security interests different from
that in Article 9 rather than considering the extent to which a Federal statute governs the
rights of the parties and third parties. If such a place of filing is provided by a Federal
statute, the perfection of a security interest would be governed by Federal laws despite
the fact that other aspects of copyright security interest are governed by state law.
The 1976 Copyright Act provides that mortgages and hypothecation are transfers
and dictates how transfers must be made in order to be valid. This Act also provides a
recordation scheme that requires recordation of copyright transfers at the Copyright
Office in order to give a constructive notice. Thus, the Copyright Act governs the
substantive rights in security interests and also governs filing, at least concerning
106
U.C.C. § 9-104 (a)( 1987).
107
See supra note 94.
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registered copyrights. However, the Copyright Act does not provide a scheme of
recordation with constructive notice of transfer for unregistered copyrights. This implies
that security interest in unregistered copyrights should be governed by Section 9-302.
The exclusion of unregistered copyright from the Copyright Act's recordation scheme
also limits the impact of section 9-104. Copyright Act's perfection scheme is limited to
registered copyrights, so Article 9 could govern the right of the parties and third parties
concerning unregistered copyrights.
4. Patent issue
The Official Comment to Section 9-104 of Article 9 seems to imply that the Patent
Act does not contain sufficient provisions regulating the rights of the parties and third
parties to exclude security interests in patents from the dispositions of Article 9.
i no
However, the recording provisions of the Patent Act seem sufficient under Section 9-
302(3) to preempt Article 9 from perfecting the security interest by recording it.
Nevertheless, The Official Comment of Section 9-302(3) does not list the patent Act
among the examples of federal statutes given that trigger the preemption provisions. In
Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral*
,
Paul Heald wonders
whether "the drafters of Article 9 intend for state filings to perfect interests in patent, but
federal filing to perfect interest in copyrights?" 1 10Professor Heald notes that one possible
108
See 35 U.S.C. § 47. The recording provisions under this Act are recognized as the equivalent of filing
under Article 9.
109 PAUL HEALD, Resolving the Priority in Intellectual Property Collateral, 1. J. INTELL.PROP.L.135
(1993)
110
Id. at 156
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"explanation might lie in the different indexing systems used in the Copyright and Patent
office.""
1
B. Federal preemption
1. Definition
Preemption may be express. This means that the preemption can be directly
based on the terms of the statute. Even if the terms of the preemption are not expressly
preemptive, a federal statute may be implicitly preemptive of a state law that conflicts
with it. There is an implicit preemption when the state law conflicts with the federal law
either in the sense that compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or in the
sense that state law obstructs the accomplishment of congressional attempts. 113 In
addition implicit preemption is permitted even if a federal statute has an express
preemption clause that does not cover the subject matter of the state law. 114
Another variant of preemption is called the "field preemption". This occurs when
"the scheme of federal preemption is so persuasive as to make reasonable the interference
that Congress left no room for the state to supplement it." 115
111
Id.
112 Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state laws are invalid if they "interfere with, or are
contrary to the laws of the Congress . . .", See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,211 (1824)
113 See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1973), and the court stated that " the patent law
does not explicitly endorse or forbid the operation of [ state] trade secret. However,... if the scheme of
protection developed by Ohio... clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws... then the state law
must fall."
1.4
See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966; see also 15 U.S.C. S 1392 (d), 1397 (k),
(1988)
1.5
See Grade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
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2. Case law
a. Cases: first period
The Supreme Court found that the Federal Intellectual Property Statute strongly and
implicitly preempts state law in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co 116 and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc . The Supreme Court found that state law conflicted with the
objectives and policy of the Patent Act. Both cases involved the question of whether state
unfair competition laws could protect against the copying of an unpatented lamp. In each
case the plaintiffs patent had been held invalid but the defendant was nevertheless found
guilty of unfair competition under state law and enjoined from copying the lamp.
The Supreme Court in both cases held that a state law providing patent like protection fell
within the subject matter of the Patent Act but failed to qualify for a patent under federal
law.
b. cases: second period
In Goldstein v. California and in Kenawee Oil Co v. Bicron Corp 119 , the court
held that the state law did not conflict with federal Copyright and Patent law respectively.
In these cases, either the subject matter addressed by the statute did not fall within the
subject matter of the federal statute or it did so, but the state law in question presented no
conflict with the federal statute.
116
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225(1964)
117
See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)
118
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561-70 (1973)
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In Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 120 The Court reaffirmed Stiffel 121 and Compco n2 .
Here the court reaffirmed that "By offering patent like protection for ideas deemed
unprotected under the federal patent scheme, the Florida statute conflicts with the "strong
federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection".
However, the court underlined that federal and state law could and did coexist. Referring
to its decisions in Kenawee and Goldstein, the court stated that where the congressional
objectives are not frustrated, state law could stand. The analysis used by the court in
Bonito Boats reveals that the court uses a balancing test to determine whether there is an
implicit preemption. As an illustration, in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats,
4
the
court stated:
our past decisions have made clear that state regulation of
intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the
balance struck by Congress in our patent laws. The tension
between the desire to freely exploit the full potential of our
incentive resources and the need to create an incentive to deploy
those resources in constant.
119
120
See Kenawee Oil Co v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974)
See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989). See also PAUL HEALD, Federal
Intellectual law Property and the economics ofpreemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991)
121 376 U.S. 225(1964)
122 See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)
123
See supra note 119 at 141.
124
Id.
125
Id.
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C. Case law
1. In patent
a. In general
Section 26 1 of the Patent statute requires the recordation of the assignment of patent to
ensure validity as against subsequent purchaser or mortgagee. This allusion to a
mortgagee seems to refer to a mortgagee with a security interest. However, this is not the
case.
In Waterman .v. McKenzie 126 the Court held that "the filing with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark office is equivalent to a delivery of possession, and makes the title of the
mortgagee complete towards all other persons, as well as against the mortgagor".
In addition, Title 37 § 3.11 of the Code of Federal Regulations states that an
"assignment accompanied with cover sheets . . . will be recorded in the [Trademark and
Patent Office] office. Other documents . . . affecting title to applications, patents, or
1 7R
registrations, will be recorded at . . . the discretion of the commissioner". Furthermore,
In re Cybernetic services, Inc. v. Matsco, the court stated that as the terms "security
interest" and "lien" are not mentioned at all in the Code of Federal Regulations, they
cannot be considered as an "assignment". The other case law on this issue adds to the
confusion.
126 Waterman v. Mc Kenzie, 138 U.S 252 (1891), in the past patent mortgage have been considered as
patent assignment" or assignment made for the express purpose of securing a loan.
l27 37C.F.R.§3.11. 180(1999)
l28 37C.F.R.§3.11. 180(1999)
129
In re Cybernetic services, Inc. v. Matsco, 239 B.R. 917, (920)
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b. Issues
The question is whether the Patent Act regulates the perfection of security interests.
In other words, can an assignment be considered as it including in its scope the grant of a
security interest and can a secured party or lien holder be assimilated to a "mortgagee"?
An assignment is the act of transferring to another all or part of one's property, interest or
rights.
130
Therefore, from this definition, an assignment involves a transfer of title.
Re Cybernetic services, INC. v. Matsco 121 is a recent case dealing with this issue. The
main asset of the bankruptcy estate of Cybernetic Services, Inc was a patent for a data
recorder. A U.C.C.-l financing statement was timely filed with the secretary of state by
the creditors Matsco and Financial. However, Matsco and Financial filed neither a
financing statement nor any other document with the Patent Office. The court held that:
(1) Patent Act, by providing comprehensive regulatory system for
recording patent "assignment", did not preempt state law
governing the perfection of security interests, as the law was
applied to perfection of security interest in patent, (2) and creditor
properly perfected its security interest in patent by recording in
accordance with requirements of Article 9 of the California
Commerce Code.
The analysis of the Court suggests that all security interests in
Patents are governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C. and can only be perfected
through filing in the appropriate state office.
130 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990).
131
See supra note 128 at 917.
132
Id
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Reaching the same conclusion in Holt v. United States, ' the court
held that, because a conditional security interest does not involve an actual
transfer of title, a federal patent filing did not apply to a security interest in
a patent application.
In Re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc, the creditor took a
security interest in the general intangible of the debtor, which included a
patent, and filed a local financing statement with the local secretary of
state. The creditor did not file with the Patent and Trademark Office.
Afterwards, the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee sought to
avoid the creditor's security interest. The court held that a financing
statement with the State of California was effective to perfect a security
interest in patent. The court followed the idea that the federal patent
scheme provides explicitly only for the filing of conveyances, the creation
of a security interest is not a conveyance, and therefore the state filing
system is not displaced by the federal system with respect with such
document.
The court reached the opposite conclusion in Re Otto Fabric
Co} 4The time at which perfection had occurred was the central issue in
the case since if perfection had occurred at the time the state filing was
133
134
Holt v. United States, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. ( Callaghan) 336 ( D.D.C.1973)
See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 784 (1984)
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made, the security interest would be outside the preference period
1 5
and
could not be avoided. If perfection had occurred only upon completion of
the later federal filing, the security interest would be voided by the trustee
in bankruptcy as a preferential transfer. To guide its analysis, the court
relied upon the comment to U.C.C. § 9-203, which provides that state
filing is exempted where an adequate system of filing has been set up
outside the U.C.C. The court held that "federal filing is an adequate filing
system within the meaning of the U.C.C, and that the federal filing system
therefore entirely preempts the state filing system." Under this analysis,
the Patent Act preempts the U.C.C. regarding the perfection of security
interests in patents, meaning that a filing on the state level is insufficient
for perfection. In Waterman . v. Mc Kenzie, the Supreme Court held that a
patent mortgagee was an assignment when the mortgage was created and
involving a transfer of ownership, subject to defeasance upon payment of
135 A preference is any transfer of a debtor's interest in property to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on
account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor, and made while the debtor is insolvent and within 90
days (or in the case of an "insider", one year) prior to filing the bankrupt petition that enable the transferee
to receive more than he would receive in a liquidation case if the transfer had not been made. See 1 1 U.S.C.
§ 547 (b). Thus, the elements of a preference as set forth in Section 547 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code are
the following:
1) A transfer of an interest of the bankrupt debtor,
2) To or for the benefit of a creditor,
3) For or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was made,
4) Made while the debtor is insolvent (the debtor will be presumed to be insolvent on and during the
90 days immediately preceding the filing date.)
5) Made within 90 days before the bankrupt filing (or if the creditor is an" insider", within one year
before then filing)
6)That enables the creditor to receive more than it would have received in Chapter 7-bankruptcy
liquidation had the transfer not occurred.
136
See supra note 133 at. 657
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a loan. In a conclusion, these cases are a good illustration of the obvious
uncertainty about how to perfect a security interest involving a patent.
2. In trademark
The question regarding trademark is whether a state filing serves to perfect a
security interest in federally registered trademarks, or whether a federal filing is required.
Several lower Courts have decided that the U.C.C. is not preempted by the Lanham Act's
assignment provision. In Re Roman Cleanser Co, the court concluded that a state
no
B
filing is all that is required for perfection. The court concluded that "[s]ince a security
interest in a trademark is not equivalent to an assignment, the filing of a security interest
is not covered by the Lanham Act." In Re Roman Cleanser Co., in connection with
a loan, granted National Acceptance Company of America (NAC) a security interest in its
"general intangibles", which included Roman's federally registered trademarks. NAC
recorded its security interest with the state. A few years later, Roman took out a loan
from a second creditor and the documentation stated that, in the event of default, the
creditor would be granted an exclusive perpetual license to sell the product using
Roman's trademark. Roman later filed for bankruptcy. The second creditor claimed
rights to Romans trademarks and the trustee in bankruptcy challenged that claim. NAC
claimed rights to the trademark superior to the claim of the second creditor, and the
trustee in bankruptcy recorded under that state filing system. The question was to
137
In re Roman cleanser Co, 43 Bankr. 940
138
Id
139
Id
140
Id.
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determine whether NAC's state filing was sufficient to perfect its security interest as
against competing lien holder's. The problem arises because the Federal law provides
explicitly for the filing of "assignments" in trademark and not for the other documents.
The court refused to characterize the grant of a security interest as an assignment because
title to the collateral did not pass to the secured creditor, which is a required condition for
an assignment under the Lanham Act. It also found that a security interest is an
agreement for a future assignment which, does not constitute a present assignment of the
mark. In other cases, such as for example, Re TR-3 Industries, the court reached the same
conclusion as in Re Roman Cleaner Co. As a conclusion to this point, we can observe
that courts have uniformly held that a state filing serves to prefect a security interest
under trademark law.
CHAPTER 3
PRIORITY DISPUTES
I. Introduction: General concerns
Because Chapter 1 1 illustrates the problems inherent in a double filing system, the
chapter will focus on Chapter 1 1 to provide examples of those difficulties.
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a framework for the reorganization of
eligible entities.
141 Upon the filing of chapter 1 1, a reorganization case is commenced and
the debtor becomes a debtor in possession. 142 The filing of a chapter 1 1 petition creates a
bankruptcy estate which includes "all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case." 143 The debtor in possession continues to control
and possess the property of the estate and is authorized to manage and operate its
business unless and until otherwise ordered by the court. 144 Chapter 11 reorganization
cases involving bankruptcy estates, which includes intellectual property assets, raise
issues requiring special consideration. The law classifies creditors in two groups, secured
creditors and unsecured creditors, and provides advantages to creditors who fall within
141
The Bankruptcy Code is found at title 1 1 of the United States Code, 1 1 U.S.C.§ 101, et.seq.l 1 U.S.C.§
109 in combination with 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). (13), (15), and (41) sets for the entities eligible to be debtor
undc hapter 1 1. "Persons" eligible to commence Chapter 1 1 cases include individuals and corporations,
but not governmental units (governmental units may be eligible to file debts adjustment cases under
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code).
142 See 1 1 U.S.C. §§ 301 and 1 101(1).
143
Id at §541.
144
See id at. § 1 107, 1 108 and 1 104(a). Under 1 1 U.S.C. § 1 107(a), a debtor in possession has virtually all
the rights, powers and duties of a trustee.
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the category of secured creditors. The Bankruptcy Code is one of the principal fields of
law where this distinction comes into play. The principal bankruptcy concern is the
trustee's strong-arm power under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. 145 Under theses
provisions, the test to determine if a claim is secured is whether the claim to a particular
asset is one that could be defeated by a hypothetical creditor that obtained a judgment
lien as of the date of the bankruptcy. A secured claim that could not be defeated is
protected in bankrupt proceedings. An unsecured claim that could not be defeated is
inferior to the rights of the bankruptcy trustee so that the creditor has no substantial claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding. These issues are more important because a company
intellectual property portfolio can be one of its most valuable assets. As an example a
software is relatively a new type of business asset. This central asset has taken on a
crucial role in all sectors of the economy because it brings a crucial value to
businesses.
146
This chapter will address the most substantial areas of impact of perfecting a
security interest in a company that falls into bankruptcy. This chapter will review the
different priority scheme in intellectual property right in the particular context of a
priority dispute between secured lenders and trustee-in-bankruptcy. We will consider first
the priority disputes over copyright collateral, then over patent collateral, and finally over
trademark collateral.
145
See U.S.C. § 544(A)(1)(1994).
Although it is difficult to get accurate statistics, the Bureau of the Census reports revenue growth in the
software industry from $4.3 billion in 1977 to $50 in 1992. See Competition in the Computer Industry
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. And Commercial Law of the House Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 122(1993)
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II. Priority disputes over copyright collateral
The issue is whether secured lenders, holders of judicial liens, or a trustee-in-bankruptcy
will prevail in a priority dispute. The Copyright Act and Article 9 create different
priority schemes; therefore, there will be occasions when different results will be reached
depending on which scheme is used.
A. Article 9 of the U.C.C.'s scheme
Under Article 9 of the U.C.C., priority between holders of conflicting security interests in
intangibles is generally determined by the date of perfection. 147 In other words, the
question is to determine who perfected his security interest first. In addition, the current
version of U.C.C. section 9-301(1) states that "except as otherwise provided in subsection
(2), an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of (b) a person who
becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." 148Therefore, under
section 9-301 (l)(b), the trustee will prevail if the security interest is unperfected.
B. The Copyright Act
1. Section 205 of the Copyright Act
Under section 205(c), 149 if the first transferee of an interest is the first to file, he prevails
against any competing interests. Under section 205(d), 150 an interest arising after a
See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a)( "conflicting security interest rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection")
148
U.C.C. §9-301(l)(1972).
149
17 U.S.C. § 205(c).
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competing transfer will be superior if it is recorded first under subsection (c) and it is
taken in good faith, for value, and without notice. Furthermore, section 205(d) of the
Copyright Act provides that the transfer that is executed first prevails, as long as it is
recorded with the Copyright Office within one month after being executed in the United
States, or within two months of being executed elsewhere. Thus, unlike Article 9, the
Copyright Act permits the effect of recording with the Copyright Office to relate back up
to two months.
2. Illustrations
IfA assigns to B a copyright in January 2000 and in February 2000, A conveys the
same right to C who takes without actual knowledge of the prior transfer to B, according
to section 205(c), the first transferee, B, will prevail if he recorded after the execution of
the agreement (one month in the U.S or two months if the agreement was executed
outside the country). If both B and C recorded in January 2000, B will still prevail,
however, when the one month grace period expires (or two months, for a transfer outside
the U.S.), the two transferees become competitors in a race to record. If B is the first to
record, he becomes the owner of the copyright and if C is the first to record, he becomes
the owner of the Copyright.
17 U.S.C.§ 205(d) states: As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is
recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one month after its
execution in the United States and within two months after its execution outside the United States, or at any
time before recordation in such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise, the later transfer prevails if
recorded first in good faith, for valuable consideration or the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties,
and without notice of the earlier transfer.
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3. Does Section 205(d) establish a priority scheme between two unrecorded
transactions?
In Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral, Paul Heald
1 S7
criticizes the holding in Re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd. and AEG Acquisition
Corp *"because they state that the Copyright Act preempts the state commercial Code in
resolving the right between a trustee-in-bankruptcy and an unperfected secured creditor.
One of the first issues discussed is whether section 205(d) of the Copyright Act
establishes a priority scheme between unrecorded transactions. Professor Heald argues
that Section 205(d) does not consider who would prevail between two unrecorded
transactions. However, Professor Heald declines to hypothesize where there is notice,
bad faith, or lack of consideration 1 54because, in these cases, he recognizes that the second
transaction can never prevail over previous unrecorded transactions.
In this regard, Robert H. Rotstein criticizes Professor Heald'
s
conclusions. 155Contrary to Professor Heald' s opinion, Robert H. Rotstein considers that
the second sentence of section 205(d) can be construed as implicitly resolving the issue as
to who would prevail between two unrecorded transactions. In particular, he believes
that "a first unrecorded transaction has priority over a second unrecorded transaction (or
over a second recorded transaction entered into with notice, in bad faith, or without
151 PAUL HEALD, Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
135(1993)
152 116B.R. 194
153 127B.R.3
154 See Heald, supra note 108 at 143
155 See ROBERT H. ROTSTEIN, Paul' Heald 's "resolving Priority Disputes In Intellectual Property
Collateral": a comment. 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 167 (1993).
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consideration)." 156 He adds that a state law would be preempted if taken without
consideration of this last analysis.
4. Priority disputes governed by state law
a. Peregrine: Copyright priority v. Article 9 priority
1) facts
An important issue arises when the second transferee is the trustee-in-bankruptcy (or the
debtor in possession). National Peregrine, Inc. ("NPI") was a chapter eleven debtor-in-
1 ^8
possession whose principal asset was a library of copyrights, distribution rights, and
licenses for about 145 films. 159 In obtaining a line of credit, NPI granted Capitol Federal
Savings and Loans Association of Denver ("Capitol Saving") a security interest in all
NPI's assets, including general intangibles.
160 The collateral was described in both the
security agreement and the U.C.C. financing statements filed by Capitol Savings as "all
inventory consisting of films and all accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, general
intangibles, instrument, equipment, and documents related to such inventory, now owned
156
Id. at 172
151 Id
1 8
Unless a trustee is appointed in a bankruptcy case, the debtor generally remains in possession of the
property of the estate and continues to operate the business. The debtor in possession has all the rights,
powers, and duties of the trustee, except the right to compensation and the duty to investigate the debtor. 1
1
U.S.C. §§ 1123(A), 1108.
159
See Peregrine supra note 70 at 197.
160
See id. at 197-98.
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or hereafter acquired by the debtor." 161 Capitol Savings filed its financing statement in
California, Colorado, and Utah, 162but did not record its interest at the Copyright Office
under the Copyright Act.
163
After filing for protection under Chapter 1 1 of the Bankruptcy Code, NPI claimed that
Capitol Saving' security interest was unperfected because it was not recorded in the
United States Copyright Office.
164
The Bankruptcy Court was not convinced by NPI's argument. The federal District
Court agreed, holding that the recordation provisions of the Copyright Act, rather than
the filing provisions of state law, govern the perfection of security interests in copyrights.
In other words, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit answered the question of whether a
security interest in a copyright is perfect by an appropriate filing with the Copyright
Office or by a U.C.C.-l financing statement with the relevant Secretary of State. By
ruling Capitol Savings' security interest unperfected, 165 the Federal Court diluted Capitol
161
Id. The U.C.C. financing statement describes the collateral, but was not limited to: ( i) all accounts,
contract rights, chattel paper, general intangibles, and other obligation of any kind whether owned hereafter
acquired arising out of or in connection with the sale of lease of the films, and all rights whether now or
hereafter existing in and to all security agreement, leases, invoices, claims, instruments, note, drafts,
acceptances, and other contracts or documents securing or otherwise relating to any such accounts, contract
rights, chattel paper, instruments, general intangibles or obligations and other document or computer tapes
or disks related to any of the above; (ii) All proceeds of any kind and all the foregoing property, including
cash and non cash proceeds, and, to the extent not otherwise included, all payment under insurance... or
any indemnity, warranty or guaranty, payable by reason of loss or damage to or otherwise with respect to
any of the foregoing property. Id. n. 3.
162
Capitol Saving was prudent to filed in Utah since it was incorporated there, and California since it
conducts much of its business in that state. Apparently, it filed in Colorado because its own headquarters
are located in Denver.
16
See Peregrine supra note 70 at 198.
164
Id. at 194.
165
Perfection of a security interest determines whether the security interest is effective against third parties.
For example, suppose the debtor, after granting interest in collateral to Creditor A, either sells collateral to
buyer or grants a security interest in the collateral to creditor B. Creditor A will have priority over buyer B
only if the security interest of Creditor A was perfected.
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Savings' security interest because "the holder of an unperfected security interest . . . takes
a greater risk by not . . . perfecting because an unperfected security interest does not have
priority over a subsequent judicial lien." 166
2)Trustee is a transferee
Since section 205(d) of the Copyright Act does not expressly mention lien creditors,
the first question is whether a judicial lien is a transfer within the Copyright Act. The
debtor's trustee-in-bankruptcy is considered to be a subsequent "transferee" within the
meaning of the Copyright Act. Section 20 1 (d)( 1 ) of the Act provides that "the ownership
of a copyright may be transferred ... by any means of conveyance or by operation of
law."
169
Considering the language used in certain cases, the transfer of the debtor's assets
appears to be considered to be transfer made by operation of law. 170 However, as Paul
Heald suggests, reaching the conclusion that the trustee is a transferee does not help in
answering to the question as to who prevails between the trustee and the holder of a prior
166 ROBERT L. JORDAN. & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY at 476 (1989). See also U.C.C. § 9-301 (l)(b)
167
See 17 U.S.C.§ 205(d)
168
See, e.g., Note, Creditors' Rights Issues in Copyright Law: Conflict and Resolution, 11 BALTIMORE L.
REV 406(1982).
169
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(l)(1988). Moreover, The Peregrine Court concluded
that: a judicial lien creditor is a creditor who has obtained a lien " by judgment,
levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding"... Such a
creditor typically has the power to seize and sell the property held by the debtor
at the time of the creation in order to satisfy the judgment or, in the case of
general intangible such as copyrights, to collect the revenues generated by the
intangible as they come due... Thus, while the creation of a lien on a copyright
may not give the creditor an immediate right to control the copyright, it amounts
to a sufficient transfer of rights to come within the broad definition of transfer
under the copyright Act. 1 16 B.R. at 205-06
See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Fed. Sav.&Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine entertainment, Ltd.), 1 19
B.R. 194, 205-06 ( Bankr. C.D.Cal 1990)(find that the trustee is a section 205(d) transferee).
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171
unrecorded interest. Section 205(d) does not indicate who prevails between two
unrecorded interests. 1 Therefore, it has been suggested by Paul Heald that "a court
should apply Article 9 when a trustee seeks to avoid a security interest in copyright that is
1 77
unrecorded under Section 205(c)." The Court, however, concluded that Capitol
Savings should have recorded its security interest with the Copyright Office. As a
consequence, NPI, as a debtor in possession could, subordinate Capital Savings' interest
and recover it for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate,
174
which includes "all legal or
equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the bankruptcy
case."
175
Under the "strong-arm clause" of section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
debtor in possession is given every right and power state law confers upon one who has
• 1 77
acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings." Even though a trustee (or the debtor-
in possession) must file its security interest in front of the Copyright Office in order to
171
See Heald supra note 108 at 135
172
Cf supra page 45, n 127. There is however one exception: when a subsequent unrecorded transferee
takes with knowledge or in bad faith, or for no consideration, section 205(d) implies negatively that the
prior transferee should prevail even though he did not file. This consideration does not have any
consequences towards a trustee since under 1 1 U.S.C. § 544(1 )(a), the trustee is deemed to take for value
and without notice.
m
See Heald supra note 108 at 143
174
See Peregrine supra note 70 at 204
175
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) provides: The (debtor in possession) shall have, as of the commencement of the
case and without knowledge of (the debtor in possession) or of any creditors, the right and powers of, or
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
by— (1) a creditor that extend credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and that
obtains, at such and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all the property on which a creditor of a
simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not, such a creditor exists.
177
In re Peregrine, 1 16 B.R. at 204
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perfect its security interests, we know from Peregrine that as a matter of bankruptcy law
he would be deemed to have done so.
1 "70
Robert H. Rotstein points out that the court take this concept from the Ninth
J Of)
Circuit's opinion in Sampsell v. Straub and seems to regret that Professor Heald
focuses on the language used in AEG concerning what a trustee should do under state
bankruptcy law. Indeed, Robert H. Rotstein states that "irrespective of whether a judicial
lien creditor must file with the Copyright Office, there is little question that it may . .
.,
and as a matter of bankruptcy law, will be deemed to have exercised this right." 181 Since
the U.C.C. provides that a judicial lien has priority over an unperfected security interest,
the court held that Capitol Saving's unperfected security interest in NPI's copyrights and
the receivables they generated was "trumped by the debtor's hypothetical judicial lien".
In conclusion, NPI could have "avoid[ed] Capitol Savings interest and preserve[d] it for
the benefit of the bankruptcy estate" and by doing so, increased the amount available for
distribution to unsecured creditors.
b. Re AEG Acquisition Corporation v. Zenith Production Ltd: Confirmation of
Peregrine.
The case of Re AEG Acquisition Corporation v. Zenith Production Ltd also deals with
questions regarding the perfection of a security interest in copyrights, and confirms the
holding of Peregrine. The United states Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of
178
See 194F.2d228,231
179
C/supra note 131
180
Peregrine cites the ninth Circuit at 1 16 B.R. 207 note 19.
181
Cfsupra note 131, page 174
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California permitted the debtor-in-possession for a bankrupt film distributor to recover, as
voidable preferences
183
and fraudulent transfers, 184 payment made for the distribution
rights in unregistered foreign films, because the creditor's security interest in the
IOC
copyright was not perfected.
AEG Acquisition Corporation ("AEG") was a chapter 1 1 debtor whose principal asset
was a library of more than 100 motion pictures. 186 In 1987, AEG's predecessor, Atlantic
Entertainment group, Inc. obtained from Zenith Productions the distribution rights for
three pictures: Patty Hearst , For Queen and Country , and The Wolves of Willoughby
Chase.
187When Atlantic failed to pay Zenith the guaranteed amounts under the
agreements, the parties renegotiated the contracts, and Atlantic executed a confession of
judgment 188 for $ 6 million. 189
182
Id.
183 A preference is any transfer of a debtor's interest in property to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on
account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor, and made while the debtor is insolvent and within 90
days (or in the case of an "insider", one year) prior to filing the bankruptcy petition that enables the
transferee to receive more than he would receive in a liquidation case if the transfer had not been made. See
U.S.C. § 547 (b). Thus, the elements of a preference as set forth in Section 547 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code are the following:
1
)
A transfer of an interest of the bankrupt debtor;
2) To or for the benefit of a creditor;
3) For or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was made,
4) Made while the debtor is insolvent (The debtor will be presumed to be insolvent on and during the 90
days immediately preceding the filing date);
5) Made within 90 days before the bankrupt filing ( or if the creditor is an "insider", within one year before
the filing)
6) That enables the creditor to receive more than it would have received in Chapter 7-bankruptcy
liquidation had the transfer not occurred.
18 A fraudulent transfer is one made with an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. See 1 1 U.S.C. §
548(a)(1)
185
In re AEG Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. at 38
186
Id at 37
187
Id.
188 A confession ofjudgment is a "written authority of [a] debtor and his direction for entry of judgment
against him in the event he shall default the payment. Such provision is a debt instrument... [that] permit
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Kartes Video Communication, Inc. ("KVC") had acquired Atlantic and renamed it
AEG. 190 Zenith entered into a new agreement with KVC whereby AEG would reacquire
the motion picture distribution for the three movies rights for $6 million. 191 Although the
contract called for a confession of the judgment for $6 million, it also required
destruction of the judgment upon payment of all sums under the agreement. ' AEG also
gave Zenith a security agreement in the motion picture, and Zenith filed a U.C.C.-l
financing statement in California, Indiana, and New York. 193 Zenith recorded a copyright
mortgage in the Copyright Office for each of the films but later obtained a copyright
registration only for Patty Hearst.
194 Under this agreement, AEG paid Zenith $250,000
on April 12, and $1.81 million on May 10, 1989. 1950n July 28, 1989, AEG filed its
chapter 1 1 petition.
196
Afterwards, AEG filed an adversary proceeding against Zenith to
recover the more than $2 million in payment made to Zenith.
Judge Buffer noted that under section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's
hypothetical lien creditor status entitles it to prevail over holders of unperfected security
interest. Thus, Zenith must have perfected its security interest in the three films in order
the creditor or his attorney on default to appear in the court and confers judgment against the debtor."
BLACK LAW DICTIONNARY 259-60 ( 6ED. 1990)
189 See AEG Acquisition Corp., supra note 184 at 37
190
See. id
191
See. id
192
See. id.
193
See. id. at 38.
194
See .id.
195
See. id.
196
See. id.
197
See. id.
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to retain payment under the agreement. The court held that Zenith's security interest was
valid in the Patty Hearst film.
Ultimately, the court held that Zenith was required to comply with domestic United
States law to perfect its security interest in the two other films. The court hold that "Since
Zenith did not register the underlying foreign films, third parties were not put on notice of
the copyright mortgages for the foreign films, and Zenith's interest remained
unperfected."
199
In conclusion, we can determine from theses two decisions that the trustee is
deemed to have recorded in the Copyright Office. Under 1 1 U.S.C.§544(a)(l), the trustee
assumes the status ofjudicial lien creditor under state law and is given the power to avoid
all interest that are subordinate to such lien creditor under state law. The trustee will be
deemed to have recorded all statutory requirements necessary to perfect under state law.
Nevertheless, the courts in Peregrine and AEG failed to note that no such filing is
necessary under California law. In California, as in most states, a lien creditor may
execute a lien on a copyright or patent without making any filing at all.
It is interesting to note that the Article 9 priority rules lead to the same result found by the
court in Peregrine and AEG. Indeed, under section 9-30 1(b) of Article 9, a lien creditor
has priority over an unperfected security interest.200We can conclude that under 1 1 U.S.C.
§ 544(1 )(a), the trustee has the power to avoid any unperfected interest.
98
See AEG Acquisition Corp., supra note 184 at 40.
199
See id at 82.
200
See U.C.C. § 9-30 l(b)( 1990)
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c. Doctrinal criticism
Peregrine's decision has triggered a lot of different comments. For example,
Representative Hughes remarked upon introducing the Copyright Reform Act of 1993,
that Peregrine's decision has "turned a relative simple business transaction into a
nightmare for businesses and lenders. Moreover, given that a number of lenders, have in
the past, only made UCC filings, there is considerable uncertainty about past
901 «
transactions." Thus, considering Representative Hughes' statement, the Peregrine case
not only creates uncertainty for future decisions but also for past decisions.
Robert H. Rotstein, however, considers the holdings in Peregrine and AEG not to be as
unfair as they seem
202
. On the one hand, he argues that it is inequitable to deprive a
secured creditor from his priority in favor of a trustee-in-bankruptcy or a debtor in
possession, even if he did perfect his security interest by filing with the state office.
However, he continues his reasoning by pointing out that each system, either federal or
state, has its own weaknesses. To illustrate his opinion, Robert H. Rotstein cites section
9-312(5) of the U.C.C. This section gives priority to a second transferee over a first even
if he has knowledge of the previous transfer. It appears unfair to make it possible for a
secured creditor with knowledge of a previous transfer to have priority.
201
139 Cong. Rec.S. 1618 ( daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993)
202
Cfsupra note 131
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In addition, he believes that the Peregrine holding serves the commercial practice
because while the copyright Office uses a work-based register, the state recording
systems are "debtor-based".
204He asserts that
Lending institutions favor a federalized system of recordation
because they believe that such a system affords them more
certainty as to who has the right to a particular work. Conversely,
the motion picture producers believe that the uncertainty of a
debtor-based state law could hinder their ability to borrow by
making lenders more reluctant to lend. 205
The Peregrine court acknowledges that federal filing was less convenient
and less useful than filing under the U.C.C. Moreover, the court admitted
that it was up to Congress, or eventually the Copyright Office, to change
the procedures if the actual methods of recordation appear to be
burdensome. In response, Senator DeConcini and representative Hughes
introduced in February 1 993 the Copyright Reform Act in order to modify
the recordation and registration requirements. The following section
will examine the priority disputes over patent collateral.
See 17 U.S.C § 205(c). Under the Copyright Act, records are indexed only by titles and registration
numbers of works, and not by the name of the copyrighted owner or transferee.
204
205
See U.C.C. § 9-402. Under the U.C.C, financing statement are indexed by the name of the debtor
Cf supra note 131, page 1 77
206
See S. 373/H.R. REP. No 897, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
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Priority disputes over patent collateral
A. Section 261 of the Patent Act
To begin with, the federal patent Act sets forth a filing system and a basic rule to
resolve disputes. Section 261 provides that "[a]n assignment, grant or conveyance
shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable
consideration, without notice unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office
within three months from its date or prior to the date of subsequent purchase or
mortgage."
As discussed previously, the official comment to Section 9-104 of Article 9
suggests that the patent Act does not appear to contain sufficient provisions to establish
the right of parties and third parties to exclude security interests in patents from the
provisions of Article 9. Furthermore, one must remember that federal provisions control
whenever a conflict exists between a state law and a federal law.208 Moreover, we cannot
conclude from the cases nor from the congressional activity that the Patent Act preempts
entirely state law regarding patent. Thus, State law could be used as long as it does not
conflict with the Federal field.
B. Control of priority disputes by federal law
Federal law governs certain disputes. To begin with, section 261 of the Patent Act
governs a recorded assignment. A recorded "assignment, grant or conveyance" has
207
See 35 U.S.C.§ 26 1(1988).
208
See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 635 (1969) (holding that patent law does not preempt state law contract
rules affecting the patent licenses)
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priority over any subsequent interest and any prior unrecorded interest. In addition, it
is important to note that considering Waterman v. Mackenzie, a mortgage of a patent
can be considered to be a transfer of title, and can thereby operate as an assignment. In
other words, when Section 26 1 of the Patent Act refers to "subsequent purchasers", it
could mean that subsequent mortgagees can supersede unrecorded assignments, which is
just another way to refer to subsequent assignees. As was emphasis by Marci Levine
Klumb,211 "the rationale behind the interpretation that a mortgage transferred title to the
lender was that the lender could be assured of repayment if the lender held title to assets
that would be sold upon the debtor's default."
Regarding an unrecorded assignment, the Patent Act resolves most of the disputes
between parties who have not recorded their interests. Under the last-in-time rule of
section 261, an assignee or purchaser without notice, and for good consideration takes
precedent over all previously unrecorded interests. In addition, if the last assignee has
not recorded, all previous unrecorded interests do not prevail against it. Au contraire, an
assignee or purchaser who takes with knowledge, "constructive or actual", of a previous
interest takes subject to that interest.
209 35U.S.C.§261 (1988).
210
138 U.S. 252 (1891)
MARCI LEVINE KLUMB, Perfection ofSecurity Interest in Intellectual Property: Statutes Preempt Article
9, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 135 (1988)
212
See infra note 200, at 258-259
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B. Governance of priority disputes by state law.
Til
The court held in City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc. and in Re Transportation
Design Technology, Inc, 4 that under the U.C.C., a security interest in a patent need not
to be recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office to be perfected as against lien
creditors, because the federal statute governing patent assignment specifically provides
for subsequent purchase or mortgage but not for lien holders.
In Re Transportation Design Technology, Inc, 215 the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy
sought to limit a secured creditor's claim asserting that the creditor's security interest in
the debtor's patent was unperfected. The creditor had obtained a security interest in all
general intangibles and filed a U.C.C.-l financing statement. The court held that in
order to perfect its interest against lien creditors, and in the present case a trustee in the
9 1 7
shoes of a hypothetical lien creditor, the creditor's U.C.C.-l filing was sufficient, and
therefore, the secured creditor was protected. In other words, because the Patent Act's
priority scheme applies to "any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable
consideration," it does not require a recording in the Patent and Trademark Office to be
perfected against lien creditors. Furthermore, in City Bank & Trust Co.,219 the court
approved the holding in re Transportation Design Technology and held that "the failure
213 83B.R. 780 (D. kan.1988)
214 48 B.R 635 ( Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1984)
215 48 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D.Cal. 1985)
216
See id at 635
Under U.C.C. § 9-301(1995), an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person
who become a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected, and "a lien creditor" includes a trustee
in bankruptcy.
218 48 B.R. at 639
2,9
See Otto Fabric, 83 B.R.
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of the Patent statute to mention protection against creditors suggests that it is unnecessary
to record an assignment or other conveyance with the Patent Office to protect the
770
applicant's security interest against the trustee."
The issue in City Bank & Trust Co was whether perfection of a security interest in a
patent had occurred within the 90-day preference period set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code. If the U.C.C. filing deadline was the one to take into consideration for perfection,
the bank was perfected outside the preference period, but if the Patent and Trademark
Office's date was the date of perfection, it fell within the preference period.
The court stated that Section 261 does not state any requirement that it is necessary to file
an assignment in the Patent Office in order to perfect a security interest and the statute
does not address the perfection of a security interest as against any subsequent purchasers
777
or mortgagees for value, and is thus only partially preemptive.
In conclusion, federal filing is not required by the statute for protection against lien
creditors, whether the federal statute is partially or totally preemptive. The following
section will examine the rules of priority in trademark.
Priority disputes over trademark
77^
Section 1060 of the Lanham Act provides:
A registered mark... shall be assignable with the goodwill of the business
in which the mark is used....assignments shall be void as against any
220
See Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. at 782
221
See id. at 782
See id, the court held that section 261 did not address the perfection of assignments against such
claimants.
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subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, unless it
is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months of the
date thereof or prior to such subsequent purchase.
This section is very similar to Section 261 of the Patent Act.
All decisions indicate that perfection of a security interests in a trademark is a
question of state law and that priority disputes are governed by Article 9. The case law
uniformly holds that an assignment, as a present transfer of title, is distinct from a
security interest, and therefore, state law controls security interests in trademark.
In Joseph v. 2000 Valencia, Inc.224 an asset purchase agreement was entered into
under which the purchaser pledged trademark assets as collateral for a portion of the
purchase price. The seller recorded a memorandum of security agreement with the U.S
Patent and Trademark Office and filed a financing statement with the Secretary of
State. The financing statement was found to contain a defective description because it
incorrectly stated that the seller, instead of the buyer, had granted a security interest.
Afterwards, the seller corrected the exhibit to the financing statement through a U.C.C-2
Amendment. After, the purchaser filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition and the seller
became the defendant in a preference action, brought by the Trustee, due to the filing of
the U.C.C-2 Amendment within 90 days of the commencement of the bankruptcy
case. The Bankruptcy Court held that the trademark constituted a general intangible
223 15U.S.C.§1060(1988)
224
In re 199Z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778, Bankr. CD. Ca 1992.
225
Id at 779.
226
Id at 779-780; see also 1 1 U.S.C. § 547.
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and that the perfection was required in conformity with the Uniform Commercial
Code. 227 The Bankruptcy Judge cited the Uniform Commercial Code official comment to
Section 9-106 where copyright, trademarks and patents, come under the term "general
intangible" except to the extent that they may be excluded by Section 9- 104(a). ("If
subject to a statute of the United States and governed the right of parties and third parties
affected by transaction in particular type of property.")
The Court distinguished this case from Peregrine, recognizing that while many of
the characteristics supporting federal preemption of state law are equally applicable to
trademark such as the unique federal interest in the subject matter as shown through
comprehensive federal legislation, promotion of uniformity, and lack of situs of the
personal property because of its incorporeal nature, "one critical distinction exists
between the federal legislation at issue in Peregrine and the Lanham Act trademark
legislation." The court held that while the Copyright Act provided expressly for the
filing of any mortgage or hypothecation of a copyright including a pledge of copyright as
security or collateral for a debt, the Lanham Act expressly provides only for the filing of
an assignment of a trademark, and the definition of an assignment does not include
pledges, mortgages or hypothecation of trademarks. Therefore, the court concluded
the Lanham Act was different form the Copyright Act in that the granting of a security
interest in a trademark is not the equivalent of an assignment of the trademark and that
27
In re 199Z, Inc, at 781.
228
U.C.C.§9-104(a)(1994)
229
In re 199Z, Inc, In re 199Z, Inc, at 782. See 15 U.S.C. § 547.
230
Id
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the filing in the Trademark and Patent Office was a nullity. The court found its
conclusion to be conforming with decisions holding that federal law is not preemptive in
the area of trademark and that the filing of a U.C.C.-l financing statement is necessary in
order to perfect a security interest in such collateral. The court held that the seller's
initial filing U.C.C.-l financing statement failed to describe the collateral of the debtor
in which the seller claimed a security interest. Therefore, the court found that the initial
U.C.C.-l financing statement was ineffective to perfect a security interest in the
trademark and that the debtor's contention that the later U.C.C-2 financing statement as
amended duly perfected a security interest arising from the U.C.C.-l financing statement
has no validity.
The court stated that its conclusions were "harmonious" with those of other
bankruptcy courts, and referred to Creditors Committee of TR-3 Industries v. Capital
Bank, and Roman Cleanser Co. v. National Acceptance Co.
IV. New Article 9 of the U.C.C.
A. Section 9-109(c)
The new Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). 234 It is currently
under consideration by several states but it has not yet adopted by any.
The initial financing statement was seriously misleading and therefore could not be cured as a minor
error under U.C.C. § 9-402 (8)
232
In re TR-3 Indus, 41 B.R. 128 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 1984). (In re TR-3 Indus. Related to registered and
unregistered trademarks.)
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One must consider that it seems the intent of the drafters of the new Article 9 is to
reject the holding in re Peregrine regarding the complete preemption by the federal filing
system with regard the copyrightable subject matter and its proceeds. It is unlikely,
however that the new Article 9 will have this effect. Section 9- 109(c) states that "This
Article does not apply to the extent that: (a) A statute, regulation, or treaty of the United
States preempts this article..." By comparison, the corresponding section to current
Article 9, Section 9-104, provides in pertinent part that: "This article does not apply. . .to a
security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute
governs the rights of the parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular
type of property."
It is clear that Article 9 defers to federal statute only to the extent that such
deference is required by federal preemption. Thus the uncertainty with regard to the
aforementioned issues, which the preemption's guidelines seek to resolve, remains
unresolved.
Thus, new Article 9 is not going to reverse or limit the holding of Peregrine. Indeed,
courts and commentators have interpreted §9-104 of the old Article 9 as serving the "gap
filling" function intended by the new Section 9- 109(c). In addition, the Peregrine court
held that the federal priority scheme for copyright is comprehensive, consequently
leaving no gap to be filled by Article 9 new or old. In spite of this, we still do not know
33 Roman Cleanser Co. v. National Acceptance Co (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R.940 (Bankr. E. D.
Mich. 1984), aff d, 802 F.2d 207(6th Cir. 1986). Roman Cleanser concerned federal trademark registration.
234 NCCUSL is a national organization of practicing lawyers, judges, law professors and others appointed
by the governor of each state. U.C.C.U.S.L drafts uniform laws in various fields and then propose them to
the various state legislatures for adoption.
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what could be the effect of new Article 9 because a court may want to distinguish
between its findings and those of Peregrine's.
B. The revised priority rule
Current section 3-301 will be replaced by Revised U.C.C. section 9-3 17(a) which
states "An unperfected security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the rights of:
(2) a person that becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of the time the security interest
or agricultural lien is perfected or a financing statement covering the collateral is filed."
Under the current law, the filing of a financing statement, a security interest is not
perfected until it has attached. However, new Section 9-3 1 7(a) will reverse the date on
which the secured creditor gains priority over the holder of subsequent judicial liens. In
other words, if a lender who files a financing statement describing its borrower's
collateral on January 1 but does not make an advance until February 1, he is subordinate
to an unsecured creditor who gets a judicial lien during the interim.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no reason to permit creditors who have complied with all of the steps required to
perfect their security interests to escape the equality of distribution reached in
bankruptcy. Security interest without priority over all potential competing lien claims in a
state forum will not prevail in bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed since 1978 the
bankruptcy Code section 544(a) has empowered trustees in bankruptcy to turn secured
Attachment occurs when the three requirement are fulfilled;(l) the debtor executes a security agreement
(or takes possession),(2) the secured party gives value and (3) the debtor has the right to the collateral.
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but unperfected security interests into unsecured creditors. Under Article 9, priority
between conflicting perfected security interest is determined by which party perfected
first; lienholder's notice of a preexisting security interest is irrelevant. Both the Patent
Act and the Lanham Act require, however, that a subsequent transferee take for value and
without notice of the earlier transfer in order to prevail over a prior unrecorded
assignee. The Copyright Act similarly provides that a subsequent transferee may
prevail only if he records first and has taken for value, in good faith, and without notice
of the earlier transfer. Nevertheless, the need of clarity in that area has to be taken into
consideration and should be subjected to a reform. This thesis defends the idea that
lenders and their attornies should file under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and with the Copyright Office or the Patent and Trademark Office. This is a question of
prudence. In addition, the recourse to arbitration could be an effective and useful
solution.
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CHAPTER 4
PROPOSAL
Many recommendations have been proposed the past last year and have a common
point, which is the identification of the uncertainty generated by the present legislation
and the case law interpreting the present statutes. That is why, the need of a solution to
the issues discussed earlier is absolutely needed.
I. Doctrine
A clarification of the federal recording provisions or of the applicable provisions of
the U.C.C. is called for. Considering the uncertainty that exists in the use of intellectual
property as collateral, many authors have suggested that amendments of federal law and
clarification of the U.C.C. is necessary. Therefore, some propositions, as to how to
resolve the existent difficulties have been made. For example, Marci Levine Klumb
thinks that the Congress should amend the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts. On the
one hand, Marci Levine Klumb noticed that a close examination of the Patent and the
Copyright Act reveals that the commentators usually refer to these Acts as examples of
Federal acts. This is why Marci Levine Klumb suggests that the congress should
237
See Klumb, supra note 210 at 135.
238
See id
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intervene in order to clarify that theses statutes preempt Article 9. However, even though
her view is the most radical solution, it is quite uncertain that such reform would happen.
Indeed, a legislative reform by itself is hard to achieve. It seems quite unrealistic that the
Congress would reform three federal Acts at the same time.
Furthermore, Robert S. Bramson states that "this is a ripe area for an amendment to
the applicable provisions of the U.C.C., clarification of the official comments to the
U.C.C or clarification of the federal recording statute [is necessary]." It has been
suggested that the recording of the transfers provisions of the copyright act should
specify "filing under this section is the sole method of perfecting a security interest in a
patent/federal registered trademark /federally registered copyright notwithstanding state
law to the contrary interest remain subject to state law". 40 According to Bramson,
Section 9-106 of the U.C.C. should state that "Examples of general intangibles include
patent, copyright and trademark, federally registered patent, copyright and trademark,
however, are excluded from filing requirements under this Article. Moreover, he adds
that the second paragraph of the comment 1 U.C.C. 9-104 should state that
the patent, copyright and trademark acts do not contain sufficient
provisions regulating the right of the party and a third party to
exclude security interests in such property from the provisions of
this Article. The filing provisions of the federal statute, however,
are recognized as the equivalent of filing under this Article. 241
239 ROBERT S. BRAMSON, Intellectual Property as Collateral- Patent, Trade Secret and Copyrights, 36
Bus. Law.1567 (1981)
240
Id.
241
Id.
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Finally, comment 8 to U.C.C. §9-302 should state that "the federal patent,
copyright, and trademark acts are the type of statute referred to in section
9-302(a). The filing of a financing statement under the U.C.C. is
ineffective to perfect a security interest in federally registered patent,
copyright, and trademark."
II. The mixed perfection approach
Admitting the importance of resolving the current inconsistencies in the law
regulating the perfection of security interests in intellectual property, the Patent,
Copyright and Trademark section of the American Bar Association (ABA) formed an Ad
Hoc Committee on Security Interests in 1989 to review the problems and to propose
some solutions.
243
Moreover, the ABA's Business law Section also participated by
creating a Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property in 1 990. 244 The task
force submitted a report that proposes changes in the current inadequate system of laws
regarding security interests. 245 In addition, the Article 9 Study Committee of the
Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. reported to a joint project of the American Law
242
Id.
243 American bar ass'n section of business law, security interest in intellectual property:
CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM, 11,11 (1992), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Security
Interests ofthe ABA section ofPatent, Trademark and Copyright Law.
See Report of the ABA Task Force on Security Interest in Intellectual Property, in American LAW INST.
& AMERICAN BAS ASS'N, THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ,423(1993)
245
See id, at 435-36
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Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with
proposals for reform of the system governing security Interests in Intellectual Property.
24
A. The task force proposal
The task force is in favor of a mixed approach. In submitting its project, the task
force suggests that, in order to perfect a security interest, a lender would have to file a
UCC financing statement against its borrower, in conformity with Article 9, in the state
office.
247
Furthermore, in addition to the state filing, a lender is required to file "a copy
of the UCC financing statement filed with the state at a federal level and in conformity
with the rules of the Patent and Trademark or Copyright Office. Perfection of a
security interest is accomplished by a U.C.C. filing. Failure to file at a federal level
would not be an obstacle to a perfection at all. 4
Under the ABA approach, a federal notice system is used in order to obtain priority
against a claimant other that purchasers for value. Thus, even though the apparent
advantage of the ABA task force proposal is that a perfection is made by a U.C.C. filing,
246
See PERMANET EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE ARTICLE
9 STUDY COMMITTEE 50-55(1992). The Board consulted with the Task Force on Security Interest in
Intellectual Property of the ABA Section of Business Law, representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Security Interests of the ABA section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce/ Commissioner of Patent and Trademarks, the Register of Copyrights, senior member of the
staff of Patent and Trademark Office and the Copyright Office, and a representative of the licensing
Executives Society.
241
See id at 431
248
See id at 436
249
See id at 435
250
Id. It is stated that the state filing of the U.C.C financing statement would establish a lender's priority
interest in the secured property as "against lien creditors, secured creditors and all third parties other than
subsequent purchasers/ assignees for value".
73
there is still the lack because in order for the effects of perfection to apply such as
priority between conflicting security interest, a federal filing is required.
The task force recognizes that the apparent virtue of its proposal is predicated on certain
elements which are:
(a) that notice filing registries indexed by debtor name be establish
by the [Patent and Trademark office] and the Copyright office; (b)
that the various "look back" periods will be eliminated or
substantially reduced; (c) that secured party will be given the
ability to file prior to federal registration and prior to imposition of
the security interest; and (d) that a filing would apply to after
acquired property and proceeds.
The ABA task force approach circumvents the defects of the actual federal
system such as the grace period, the inability to take a blanket and after
acquired property and create a new federal notice system.
B. The Article 9 report.
l.Perfection of a security interest
The Article 9 committee observed that the actual lack of clarity can only be
resolved if " both Article 9 and federal law are revised to make clear the extent to which
each governs the creation, perfection, priority and enforcement of security interests in
federally regulated intellectual property rights."
252
In addition, the Article 9 Committee
explained that the basis for their view in favor of a mixed approach is that it is almost
251
Id at 436
252 ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 213, at 50 ( Recommendation A ). The Committee go beyond and
suggests that " the [U.C.C] Drafting Committee should revise § 9-104 (a) or the official comment to state
that Article 9 apply to such security interests to the extent permitted by the Constitution and should revise
§ 9-302(3) and the official comment to clarity the applicability of the subsection ."Id
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impossible to have a completely uniform set of rules or a "single filing system governing
security interests in all types of intellectual property." Furthermore, the Article 9
Committee believes that even if that was the case, "regardless of the extent to which
federal law governs, Article 9 would continue to apply to intellectual property before it
becomes subject to the federal system and to intellectual property that never becomes
subject to federal law." 254
The Study Committee proposed adding to the current federal "tract" recording
system that is indexed according to particular property a federal notice filing-system.
In agreement with the Task force proposal, the committee supports the idea that the
federal notice filing system should be indexed according to the name of the debtor and
should cover after-acquired property. In addition, contrary to the Task force proposal, the
Study committee suggests that "Article 9 and federal law should be revised to provide
that a security interest can be perfected ... either in accordance with Article 9 or by the
recordation in the appropriate federal tract index." Furthermore, the Article 9
Committee believes that a party should be able to choose between federal and a state
filing in order to perfect a security interest.
253
Id at 51
254
Id at 52
'5
Id. ( Recommendation B). The committee recommends that " federal recording systems for interest in
intellectual property.. .be reformed to establish one or more notice-filing systems for security interests."
256 ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 213, at 51 ( Recommendation C).
>7
There is a disagreement on that point with the Task Force proposal because " the Task Force believes
that perfection of security interests solely by an Article 9 filing ... is preferable to allowing secured parties
to choose between the federal and state filing." See Task Force proposal, supra note 214, at 436.
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2. Priority among creditors
Under the Article 9 report concerning the priority scheme, "consistent with its view that
the ability of third parties to rely on existing tract indexes should be preserved, the
Committee concluded that the perfection under Article 9 should not be sufficient to
establish priority over subsequent purchasers who record in the appropriate tract
index.
"
258A creditor is required to make a federal filing in order to be protected. The
priority between creditors should be resolved by taking into consideration the time of
recordation in either the federal tract system or the federal notice-filing system.
Furthermore, "a purchaser (including secured parties) who record in the federal tract
index would take free of a security interest that was perfected in accordance with Article
9 and not recorded in either federal system." In sum, perfection can be completed
either under Article 9 or the federal tract system. However, to have priority, the lender
must also record in the federal notice filing-system.
III. A federal approach only
By recognizing a wholly federal approach, that would certainly be less costly that
the mixed approach because it will be enough for the parties to file at a federal level to
perfect a security interest. Shawn Baldwin260 strongly suggests that a wholly federal
approach is the best solution to resolve the inconsistencies in the current system. He
argues that state law should be preempted because there is a general "federal interest" in
258 ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 213, at 53
259
Id at 52
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promoting the use of intellectual property in commercial transactions. He further argues
that the actual state laws are in " conflict . . . with the purposes and policies of federal
law, and that should justify the need of a preemption".
261 Shawn Baldwin' s major thesis
is that, recognizing that the aim of Intellectual property is to promote the continuing
progress of science and useful arts, a wholly federal system would definitely serves this
aim. Baldwin criticizes the ABA task force and the Study Committee because they did
not "recognize a strong federal interest in the area of intellectual property financing ....
The interests of federal government are clearly strong enough to require federal
preemption."
262Even though Baldwin's thesis could create certain uniformity, one must
realize that it is very difficult to define exactly what is a federal interest. Indeed it is a
broad notion, and as a consequence, is subject to different interpretations by the court.
In addition, Baldwin's proposal remains very broad and generalized because he only
gives general guidelines
264
without stating how each issue should be addressed.
260 See SHAWN K.BALDWIN, "7b Promote The Progress of Science and Useful Arts": A Role for
Federal Regulation ofIntellectual Property as Collateral, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1701(1995).
261
Id at 1727-28
262
Id.
263
Baldwin simply argues that there is a strong federal interest at stake which is the increase of the value of
intellectual property as a source of credit. In order to reach that point, he suggests that it is necessary to
have more consistent commercial credit laws. Id at 1732.
264
It consists mostly in establishing that federal law should preempt state law in this area. In addition, he
suggests that this should be done in the light of the strong federal interest. Id
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
There is an important need for clarity in the laws concerning the use of intellectual
property as collateral. Intellectual property is being used as collateral in secured
transactions with increasing frequency. Although both federal and state filing can be
made and should be made in most of the cases, another more practical solution could be
used.
The purpose of the following section is to convince lawyers that a way to avoid the
current inconsistencies in the law regulating the perfection of security interests in
intellectual property would be to use arbitration. Commercial parties transacting business
in interstate and international commerce designate private arbitration as the exclusive
means of dispute resolution in order to save costs, prevent delay, preserve commercial
privacy and obtain a better quality of decisions.
The general commercial preference for arbitration has the full support of the U.S.
public policy in the United States Code. In the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
Congress required federal and state courts to honor the written election of arbitration in
commercial transactions. 265In 1970, the Senate ratified the New York Convention, which
requires all signatory countries to honor and enforce arbitration agreements and awards in
265
See 9 U.S.C. (1994). Congress intended to overrule all common law hostility to arbitration in
transactions affecting commerce and to enlist the court in the task of assisting in the maintenance of a
strong arbitration system. See H.R.REP.NO.68-69, at 1-2 (1924)
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international commerce. In 1971, Congress enacted Chapter 2 of the FAA,
implementing the New York Convention through the United States Code. Then, in
1982, Congress amended the Patent Act to provide for private arbitration of patent
disputes.
268
In addition, in the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
reminded the lower courts that arbitration is a choice favored by public policy of the
United States, as evidenced by treaty and statute.
Arbitration includes the necessity for anticipating the outlines of future disputes in
selecting a proper forum and governing law. This can be done through drafting and
negotiation of particular contracts. By pointing out the more important issues that exist in
using intellectual property as collateral all along this thesis, a lawyer should take into
consideration the difficulties arising out from the existence of a double filing system, at a
federal and state level and contractually determine the rules that should be applied in
order to avoid the current inconsistencies.
266
See Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S.3
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See, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994)
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See, 35 U.S.C. §294(1994)
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